Male immorality: An evolutionary account of sex differences in unethical negotiation behavior by LEE, Margaret et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business
10-2017
Male immorality: An evolutionary account of sex
differences in unethical negotiation behavior
Margaret LEE
London Business School
Marko PITESA
Singapore Management University
Madan PILLUTLA
London Business School
Stefan THAU
INSEAD
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2015.0461
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator
of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
LEE, Margaret; PITESA, Marko; PILLUTLA, Madan; and THAU, Stefan. Male immorality: An evolutionary account of sex
differences in unethical negotiation behavior. (2017). Academy of Management Journal. 60, (5), 2014-2044. Research Collection Lee
Kong Chian School Of Business.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5142
r Academy of Management Journal
2017, Vol. 60, No. 5, 2014–2044.
https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2015.0461
MALE IMMORALITY: AN EVOLUTIONARY ACCOUNT
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Past research has found that men negotiate more unethically than women, although
many studies report comparable rates of unethical negotiation behaviors. Based on
evolutionary psychology, we predict conditions under which sex differences in un-
ethical negotiation behavior are more versus less pronounced. We theorize that greater
levels of unethical behavior among men occur because of greater male intrasexual
competition for mates. This suggests that more male unethical negotiation behavior
should primarily emerge in situations associated with intrasexual competition. Using
a two-wave survey design, Study 1 found a positive relationship between mating moti-
vation and unethical negotiation behavior for male, but not female, employees. Study 2
was a controlled experiment, replicating this effect and showing that the gender dif-
ference was most pronounced when negotiating with same-sex, attractive opponents.
Study 3 used a similar experimental design and found support for another implication of
evolutionary theory—that mating motivation would prompt unethical behavior in both
men and women when the behavior constitutes a less severe norm violation. We discuss
contributions to the literature on unethical behavior at work, negotiations, and the role
of attractiveness in organizations.
Many negotiations are competitive interactions
in which negotiators seek to maximize their out-
comes. To this end, negotiators sometimes resort to
unethical tactics. They may lie about their alterna-
tives, misrepresent the quality of their products,
and make false promises for future action (Garcia,
Darley, & Robinson, 2001; Kern & Chugh, 2009;
Murnighan, Babcock, Thompson, & Pillutla, 1999;
O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997). Such unethical
negotiating behavior is “either illegal or morally
unacceptable to the larger community” (Jones,
1991) and can lead to impasse (Volkema, Fleck, &
Hofmeister-Toth, 2004), long-term mistrust
(Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006), and harm
the relationship quality between organizations
(Hill, Eckerd, Wilson, & Greer, 2009). Understanding
when and why employees use unethical negotiation
tactics can help prevent such negative outcomes from
occurring.
The negotiations literature has long considered
sex differences as a fundamental negotiator char-
acteristic affecting negotiation behavior and out-
comes, leading Kray and Thompson (2004: 104)
to conclude that “whether gender differences
exist at the negotiation table is a timeless question”
(see also Kray & Babcock, 2006). Compared to
women, men negotiate more frequently (Babcock,
Laschever, Gelfand, & Small, 2003), reciprocate less
(Croson & Gneezy, 2009), and generally behave
more competitively (Walters, Stuhlmacher, &
Meyer, 1998). Overall, men also seem to achieve
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better outcomes in negotiations (e.g., Amanatullah
& Morris, 2010; Kray & Thompson, 2004; Mazei,
Hu¨ffmeier, Freund, Stuhlmacher, Bilke, & Hertel,
2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). Men may
achieve these superior outcomes by negotiating
more unethically than women (e.g., Haselhuhn &
Wong, 2011; Kennedy & Kray, 2014; Kray &
Haselhuhn, 2012; Westbrook, Arendall, & Padelford,
2011).
Sex differences in unethical negotiation behavior
are consistent with meta-analytic reviews summa-
rizing sex differences in unethical work behaviors
(Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010). On aver-
age, men behave more unethically than women in
work interactions. However, there is considerable
heterogeneity in existing findings,with some studies
finding no sex differences in unethical work behav-
ior (e.g., Hegarty & Sims, 1978, 1979). The negotia-
tion context is no exception. Occasionally studies
report that men and women negotiate unethically to
a comparable extent (e.g., Childs, 2012; Maurice &
Rachel, 1999; Miller, 1967; Muehlheusser, Roider, &
Wallmeier, 2015; Pruitt & Syna, 1985). The variance
in findings suggests that certain situations entice
men to negotiate unethically whereas other situa-
tions do not.
We believe that extant theories warrant extension
in terms of their ability to explain such heterogeneity
in sex differences. In fact, research on sex differ-
ences in unethical behaviors has been characterized
as atheoretical (Franke, Crown, & Spake, 1997;
Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). An exception is a hand-
ful of studies that proposed socialization as an
explanation for sex differences in unethical work
(e.g., Betz, O’Connell, & Shepard, 1989; Franke
et al., 1997) and negotiation behavior (e.g., Kray &
Haselhuhn, 2012; Ma, 2010; Westbrook et al., 2011).
Socialization-based explanations focus on the fact
that sex differences are learned from socializing
agents. While we agree that socialization is impor-
tant, in this research we extend socialization-based
perspectives by integrating them with evolutionary
theory. The goal of this theoretical integration is to
increase the predictive capability of existing models
by specifying the conditions under which sex dif-
ferences in unethical negotiation behavior should be
more pronounced, which can explain the heteroge-
neity in sex differences in unethical negotiation be-
havior.More importantly, the theoretical integration
provides a richer explanation of unethical behavior
at the ultimate (rather than just proximate) level of
causation by explaining why this particular sex dif-
ference (rather than the opposite sex difference or
no sex difference) would be promoted through
socialization.
Evolutionarymodels have been largely neglected
by organizational behavior scholars although they
can predict interesting and currently under-
examined conditions under which sex differences
are likely to emerge. Recent research revealed that
sex differences in social behavior stemming from
different evolved patterns of intrasexual competi-
tion among men and women are more strongly
expressed when people have a greater desire to
mate and when the situation signals more same-sex
competition (Baker & Maner, 2008; Griskevicius,
Goldstein, Mortensen, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006b).
We propose that more unethical negotiation be-
havior in males follows a similar logic: Sex differ-
ences in unethical negotiation behavior are more
likely to occurwhenmatingmotives are chronically
or temporarily salient in the (male) negotiator’s
mind. Specifically, we expect mating motivation to
makemen negotiate more unethically than women.
This should be particularly true in negotiations
with an attractive same-sex opponent, because at-
tractive men are stronger competitors than un-
attractive men. The sex difference should also be
stronger with respect to more severe unethical be-
haviors, which present a higher risk of third-party
negative responses. The reason being that such
negative third-party responses directed toward
women, compared to men, were more costly in
terms of reproductive fitness (Campbell, 1999;
Griskevicius, Tybur, Gangestad, Perea, Shapiro, &
Kenrick, 2009). In contrast, when mating motiva-
tion is not salient, when men negotiate with un-
attractive men, or when unethical behavior is less
severe, sex differences in unethical negotiation
behaviors should be attenuated.
We test our theory across three studies focusing on
distributive negotiations because distributive negoti-
ations represent a clear situation in which one can
gain an advantage over potential intrasexual compet-
itors by behaving unethically. We comment in the
discussion section on how our theory may generalize
to other negotiation settings. Study 1 was a two-wave
field study that allowed us to test whether negotiator
mating motivation predicts unethical negotiation be-
haviormorestrongly inmales than in females.Study2
was a controlled experiment in which we manipu-
latedmatingmotivation, opponent sex, and opponent
attractiveness and measured unethical negotiation
behavior in a standardized negotiation task. In Study
3, we vary the type of unethical behavior participants
had an opportunity to engage in to examine whether
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mating motivation also prompts unethical behavior
among women when unethical behavior constitutes
a less severe violation of the norms of socially ac-
ceptable behavior.
In addition to highlighting the crucial role of
intrasexual competition as a driver of sex differ-
ences in unethical negotiation behavior, we make
several important theoretical and practical contri-
butions. First, we provide a parsimonious theory
for sex differences in unethical behavior, a phe-
nomenon that has been the focus of much past re-
search (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Treviño, den
Nieuwenboer, & Kish-Gephart, 2014), but is under-
theorized. Second, we provide a framework that
can help detect conditions under which men
display greater levels of unethical behavior than
women. Third, we contribute to the negotiations
literature, which largely assumed that attractive
people are afforded better outcomes in negotiation
(Rosenblat, 2008; Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999). Our
work qualifies this assumption by showing that at-
tractiveness can be a hindrance to male negotiators
by evoking unethical behavior from male oppo-
nents. Fourth, we contribute to psychological work
on sex-specific mating strategies by theoretically
extending existing theory to the domain of un-
ethical behavior and deriving novel and conse-
quential boundary conditions of mating motivation
effects, including others’ physical attractiveness
and norm violation severity. Finally, a broader
contribution of our work is that we draw on evolu-
tionary psychology to advance the understanding
of a costly organizational phenomenon. The use of
evolutionary theory in organizational research is
sparse despite the fact it provides a parsimonious
and generative framework that has been used
to explain long-standing puzzles about human
behavior, including conformity, altruism, and cre-
ativity (Griskevicius, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006a;
Griskevicius et al., 2006b; Griskevicius, Tybur,
Sundie, Cialdini, Miller, & Kenrick, 2007). We
hope that our paper opens new avenues in organi-
zational research by demonstrating the potential of
evolutionary psychology to explain important or-
ganizational phenomena.
INTEGRATING SOCIALIZATION-BASED
PERSPECTIVES AND EVOLUTIONARY
THEORY
The evolutionary perspective on sex differences in
social behavior is grounded in parental investment
theory (Trivers, 1972). This theory provides an
explanation for why there are fundamental sex dif-
ferences in social behavior. The theory assumes that
men and women faced systematically different re-
productive challenges throughout evolutionary his-
tory because of differences in minimal obligatory
parental investment of each sex (Trivers, 1985).
Women undergo an energy-consuming nine-month
process of fertilization and gestation that forecloses
reproductive opportunities during that period.
Women can only reproduce a limited number of
times in their lifetime. Choosing a sub-optimal mat-
ing partner thus hadmajor implications for women’s
long-term reproductive success. In contrast, the
obligatory parental investment for men may involve
as little as engaging in a single act of sexual in-
tercourse. Men can reproduce almost an unlimited
number of times, and historical records show that
some high-status individuals such as kings had off-
spring in the thousands (Betzig, 1986). For that rea-
son, males faced lower fitness costs of mating with
a sub-optimal partner, which resulted in men
evolving to be less selective thanwomen in choosing
potential mates (Buss, 1994b; Kenrick, Sadalla,
Groth, & Trost, 1990). The lower choosiness of men
and the greater selectivity of women imply that there
will be more men competing for the opportunity to
mate with any given woman than there will women
competing for any givenman. There will be a greater
number of potential rivals formates amongmen, and
menwill have to competemore fiercely to mate than
women (Buss, 1994a).
A large body of evidence from different animal
species supports the predictions of parental in-
vestment theory regarding intrasexual competition
(Trivers, 1985). The lesser-investing sex displays
a greater level of intrasexual competition which
fuels a range of physical sex differences, including
those in size, strength, and longevity (Bjorklund &
Shackelford, 1999; Trivers, 1985). More relevant to
our question, research finds higher levels of com-
petitiveness (VanVugt, DeCremer, & Janssen, 2007)
and aggression (Archer, 2004) in men compared to
women. Moreover, men’s aggressive behavior is
primarily targeted at other men (Kenrick & Sheets,
1993;Wilson &Daly, 1985). Aggression amongmen
evolved as an intrasexual competition strategy be-
cause it allowed individuals to outperform others
by way of inflicting harm to direct rivals, deterring
potential rivals, and gaining status through domi-
nance displays (Archer, 1988; Buss & Shackelford,
1997).
We propose that more unethical negotiation be-
havior among men might also be a consequence of
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men’s evolved behavioral tendencies for intrasexual
competition. Just as same-sex aggression offers ways
for men to win competitions with other males, so
does unethical behavior. The existence of norms of
morally appropriate conduct had tremendous bene-
fits, allowing individuals to function well as groups
and achieve better outcomes (e.g., sharing resources,
fighting against predators) than they could have
achieved alone (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Krebs,
2008). However, at the level of individual competi-
tors for mates, there has always been an incentive
to transgress norms if the transgression gave the
individual an advantage over other competitors.
The evolutionary literature has identified many
such norm violating behaviors including deception
(Cummins, 1998), cuckoldry (Platek & Shackelford,
2006), and theft of resources (Buss & Duntley, 2008).
Men could have certainly competed through ethical
means. However, in situations in which unethical
behavior afforded the opportunity to outperform
competitors more easily than what was possible
through ethical means, men who engaged in such
behavior could have gained an important advantage
over men who did not behave unethically. As in the
case of aggression, and perhaps even more effec-
tively, unethical behavior could have conferred such
an advantage.
Transgressing the norms of ethical conduct was
also less costly among men than women in evolu-
tionary fitness terms, which was likely another
contributing factor to the greater reliance on un-
ethical behavior as an intrasexual competition
strategy among men. Unethical behavior elicits
risks of social sanctions since communities are
interested in upholding the norms of ethical be-
havior to maintain social order (Fehr & Ga¨chter,
2002). Those who violate standards of appropriate
behavior risk social repercussions, both informal
(e.g., gossip, ostracism) and formal (e.g., legal
prosecution). Evolutionarily, such potential costs
associated with the reliance on unethical behavior
as an intrasexual competition strategy had greater
implications for women in terms of the ability to
successfully pass down genes to the next genera-
tions. This prediction is also derived from parental
investment theory (Trivers, 1972). Specifically,
because women have a more important role in
taking care of offspring, any social repercussions
that might arise from unethical behavior used
to outperform intrasexual competitors will be
more costly in terms of the ability of a gene pool to
be passed down to subsequent generations
(Campbell, 1999; Griskevicius et al., 2009). This
notion underlies explanations for greater levels of
aggression in men:
Although both sexes can incur bodily harm from
same-sex aggression, such harm for a woman may be
costlier than for a man: Because women are the pri-
mary caretakers for offspring, they aremore critical to
offspring survival (Campbell, 1999; Taylor[, Klein,
Lewis, Gruenewald, Gurung, & Updegraff], 2000). For
instance, whereas the lack of an investing father
moderately decreases the likelihood of an offspring’s
survival, the lack of a mother nearly eliminates
a child’s probability of reaching adulthood in tradi-
tional societies (Hill & Hurtado, 1996; Voland, 1988).
(Griskevicius et al., 2009: 982)
Similarly, social penalties in response to moral
transgressions are likely to negatively impact
a woman’s ability to care for a child. These might
includephysical harm, or other typesof harmsuchas
social exclusion or a damaged reputation, which can
reduce the amount of cooperation a woman receives
from others, for example through protection or food
sharing (Benenson, 2013).
In sum, parental investment theory suggests that
men faced higher incentives as well as lower costs to
engage in unethical behavior as an intrasexual com-
petition strategy, whichmight explainwhy andwhen
menbehavemoreunethically thanwomen.To test the
idea thatmen engage inmore unethical behavior than
women because of their evolved tendencies for
intrasexual competition, we examine the relationship
betweenmatingmotivation andunethical negotiation
behavior among men and women in distributive ne-
gotiation settings. Mating motivation, or people’s de-
sire to reproduce, varies both between and within
individuals. For instance, younger people tend to be
more motivated to mate than older people (Wilson &
Daly, 1985) and browsing through pictures of attrac-
tive opposite-sex individuals increases mating moti-
vation (Baker & Maner, 2008). Examining how
individual variation inmatingmotivation is related to
unethical negotiation behavior allows us to test the
theory that men engage in more unethical behavior
because of their evolved tendencies for intrasexual
competition. Such tendencies should be more
strongly expressed when mating motivation is tem-
porarily or chronically salient (Griskevicius et al.,
2006b; Maner et al., 2005).
Consider the following example that illustrateshow
past research tested hypotheses that a certain phe-
nomenon is related to an evolved tendency for intra-
sexual competition. Li, Kenrick, Griskevicius, and
Neuberg (2012) proposed that loss aversion, the fact
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that resource losseshavemore impact thanequivalent
resource gains, should be eliminated amongmen, but
not women, when their mating motivation is high.
Men who ignored losses when competing with other
men over the course of evolutionary history stood
a greater chance of improving their status and
attracting mates. Consistent with this idea, Li et al.
(2012) found that activating mating motives (asking
participants to imagine meeting a desirable person of
the opposite sex) reduced loss aversion in men, but
not inwomen (who are less intrasexually competitive
due to the reasons we discussed previously). The
same testing approach has been widely used in mod-
ern evolutionary research (see Kenrick, Neuberg,
Griskevicius, Becker, & Schaller, 2010; Neuberg,
Kenrick, & Schaller, 2010, for reviews).
We take a similar approach by examining the re-
lationship between mating motivation and sex dif-
ferences in unethical negotiation behavior. If a greater
level of unethical negotiation behavior in men is a re-
sult of men’s tendencies for intrasexual competition,
then this tendency should bemore strongly expressed
when men’s level of mating motivation is high.
Greater levels of mating motivation should activate
the associated psychological and behavioral tenden-
cies developed to facilitate attainment ofmating goals
which, if our theory is correct, should result in greater
levels of unethical negotiation behavior among men
compared to women.
The focus on mating motivation also allows us to
demonstrate the added explanatory capability and
thus contribution of our theory to socialization-
based perspectives. Specifically, socialization theo-
ries of unethical behavior would not predict that
mating motivation should affect unethical negotia-
tion behavior. The prediction we make for the effect
of mating motives among men versus women could
also not be derived from socialization processes
alone because if mating motives affected propensity
for unethical negotiationdue to its effect on sex roles,
then mating motives should have an effect among
both men and women. Finally, we also specify and
test several additional boundary conditions in Study
2 and 3 implied by our theory that could not be de-
rived from socialization-based perspectives, pro-
viding a conservative test of our explanation and
demonstrating the increase in explanatory capability
obtained through the integration of socialization-
based perspectives and evolutionary theory.
Materials for studies testing hypotheses speci-
fied in study introductions, datasets, and analyses
syntaxes can be accessed online at the following
link (temporarily anonymized to preserve blind
peer review): https://osf.io/z2ipw/?view_only5
df6100fffb90456690bca4e1cc4ff75f.
THEORY
Recent psychological research on sex differences
in social behavior acknowledges the importance of
both biological as well as social factors on sex dif-
ferences in social behavior (Buss, 2015; Eagly &
Wood, 2013; Wood & Eagly, 2013). However, work
on sex differences in (un)ethical work behavior
specifically was largely devoid of theoretical
grounding, or alternatively focused solely on dif-
ferent socialization patterns among men and
women (Betz et al., 1989; Franke et al., 1997; Ma,
2010; McCabe, Ingram, & Dato-on, 2006; Volkema,
2004; Westbrook et al., 2011). Franke et al. (1997)
noted that research on sex differences in (un)ethical
behavior has been “largely atheoretical” and that
even “studies providing more comprehensive re-
views of gender effects have been limited to de-
scriptive ‘vote counting’ without theoretical
underpinnings.”
Onenotable socialization-based perspective of sex
differences in unethical behavior suggests that dif-
ferential treatment beginning in childhood of men
and women imparts a lastingly different gender
identity. Gilligan (1982) argued that boys and girls
are socialized into different behavioral patterns,
resulting in a stronger emphasis on relationships and
care among women. Similarly, Ruegger and King
(1992) maintained that parents condone aggressive
behavior among boys, but not girls, which should
result inmore unethical behavior amongmale adults
(see also Betz et al., 1989). Criminologists similarly
view sex differences in unethical behaviors as
caused by boys being subject to less parental super-
vision than girls (Simmons & Blyth, 1987); this is
believed to result in lower self-control andmore rule-
breaking propensity among male adults, compared
to females (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; LaGrange &
Silverman, 1999). Recent research in the context of
negotiation draws on this perspective to propose that
men act in ways consistent with their gender iden-
tity, including behaving more unethically during
negotiation. Men are particularly likely to exhibit
such behavior when they feel a need to reaffirm their
gender identity, as suggested by work based on pre-
carious manhood where men become more com-
petitive when they feel that they have something to
prove (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2012). In sum, the
socialization-based perspective argues that sex
differences in unethical behaviors are primarily
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a product of early childhood socialization and that
men remainmore unethical thanwomen later in life.
A second socialization-based perspective pro-
poses that society imposes different role expecta-
tions on men and women, and these expectations
cause sex differences in unethical behaviors. People
behave consistently with the stereotype attached to
their social roles (Eagly, 1987). Because women are
stereotyped as more communal and less selfish than
men (Eagly & Wood, 1991), role expectations may
explain why women would want to behave less
unethically than men (McCabe et al., 2006;
Westbrook et al., 2011). Role-consistent behavior has
similarly been shown to explain sex differences in
negotiation behavior (Olekalns, Kulik, & Chew,
2014). The role expectation that women behave
more ethically in negotiations may in turn prompt
people to take advantage of that fact and be particu-
larly unethical toward women (Kray, Kennedy, &
Van Zant, 2014). This perspective is more flexible
than the childhood experience account because
people can take on multiple social roles during their
life. Prescriptions associated with some roles, such
as the role of a manager, can potentially override
prescriptions associated with other roles such as
being a female (Franke et al., 1997; Robin & Babin,
1997).
These socialization-based perspectives of un-
ethical behavior, and unethical behavior in negotia-
tion more specifically, state that sex differences in
unethical behavior are either learned through pa-
rental behavior, or through expectations society
communicates to individuals. We believe that such
mechanisms do occur and influence unethical ne-
gotiation behavior (Croson & Gneezy, 2009). Clearly,
people are influenced both by their upbringing as
well as by societal expectations. However, we pro-
pose that these perspectives warrant a theoretical
extension that provides a richer and more well-
rounded account of sex differences in unethical
behavior.
The key reason why we believe socialization-
based perspectiveswarrant a theoretical extension is
that theyprimarily focusonhow social factors lead to
the adoption, transmission, and maintenance of sex
differences. They do not explain why the specific
social expectations for behavior would differ be-
tween men and women in the first place (Gangestad
& Buss, 1993; Kenrick, Maner, & Li, 2005). For ex-
ample, it is not entirely clear why parents would
permit more unethical behavior among their sons
instead of simply discouraging unethical behavior
equally among both their sons and daughters. Saying
that men and women are socialized into different
behavioral patterns may be merely a description of
one mechanism by which sex differences are per-
petuated rather than an explanation for why they
occur. In a similar vein, Kenrick et al. (2005) noted
that “appealing to social norms may simply re-
describe a phenomenon, rather than explain its
roots.”
We also believe that the ability of socialization-
based perspectives warrant extension in their power
to explain the heterogeneity of gender effects in un-
ethical behavior we reviewed at the outset of the
paper. These perspectives are relatively inflexible
and predict that sex differences should be consis-
tently obtained among people exposed to similar
socialization pressures (e.g., Hegarty & Sims, 1978,
1979;McNichols &Zimmerer, 1985; Smith &Rogers,
2000).However, even amongpopulations exposed to
similar socialization pressures, such as college stu-
dents, there is heterogeneity in terms of sex differ-
ences in unethical behavior (e.g., Betz et al., 1989;
Ruegger & King, 1992). As noted before, Kray and
Haselhuhn (2012) found that sex differences are
amplified when men feel like they need to reaffirm
their gender identity, but this factor was not sys-
tematically varied across the studies we cited which
demonstrate heterogeneity in sex differences. While
such evidence is not conclusive, socialization-based
perspectives seem to warrant a theoretical extension
that would provide additional explanations for why
people occupying similar roles would exhibit sex
differences in some situations but not in others. We
believe that integrating socialization theories with
the evolutionary theory allows for a more nuanced
and parsimonious account predicting the conditions
underwhich sex differences in unethical negotiation
behavior arise.
STUDY 1: SURVEY
Study 1 tested our theory in the field to examine
whether mating motivation could account for sex
differences in unethical behavior. We conducted
a two-wave study among employed adults who en-
gage in negotiation as part of their work. In the first
wave, we measured employees’ mating motivation
and various control variables, ostensibly as part of
a study focusing on work–life balance. In the second
wave, we collected a measure of employees’ pro-
pensity to negotiate unethically.
We tested our theory using two approaches to
provide a thorough test. The first approach is to ex-
amine the effect ofmatingmotivation as a function of
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employee sex. Our theory implies a two-way in-
teraction between mating motivation and employee
sex such that greater matingmotivation is associated
with a greater level of unethical negotiation behav-
ior, but primarily among men. This pattern of find-
ings would provide evidence for the argument that
moreunethical negotiationbehavior inmen is inpart
a consequence of evolved tendencies for intrasexual
competition. We hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1a. There is a stronger positive effect
of mating motivation on unethical negotiation
behavior for men compared to women.
The second theory test examines the effect of em-
ployee sex as a function of the level of mating moti-
vation.Our theory implies thatmen should negotiate
more unethically than women, but primarily when
their level of mating motivation is high rather than
low. This pattern of findingswould demonstrate that
sex differences in unethical negotiation behavior can
at least in part be explained by the fact thatmenmore
than women engage in unethical behavior as a result
of their evolved tendency for intrasexual competi-
tion. This result would also reveal a boundary con-
dition for sex differences in unethical negotiation
behavior (level ofmatingmotivation) thatmight help
explain the heterogeneity in sex differences in un-
ethical behavior. We predict:
Hypothesis 1b. Men negotiate more unethically
than women primarily when mating motivation
is high rather than low.
Procedure and Sample
We advertised Study 1 to employed adults from
a participant pool maintained by a behavioral lab of
a business school. The advertisement stated that we
were conducting a research project onwork-related
topics and that participants who signed up would
be invited to participate in one or more surveys.
Individuals in this behavioral lab’s participant pool
were notified of available studies via e-mail. Be-
cause we sought to examine unethical negotiation
behavior among both men and women, we strived
to attain a balanced sex ratio by advertising the
study to small batches of potential participants
(around 50) at a time. This allowed us to adjust the
ratio of males versus females in subsequent batches
to which the study was advertised based on the sex
ratio of those who had already signed up for the
study. There were no exclusions of participants in
any of the studies.
A total of 312 people participated in the Time 1
survey. Nine participants responded to the Time 1
survey twice, almost all of them the second time
several days after the initial response, which might
indicate they forgot they had already completed the
survey. We retained their first responses for data
analyses.
TheTime1 surveywas said to focus on employees’
work–life balance and contained all our in-
dependent and control variables (described in more
detail in the measurement section). The survey
opened with questions concerning participants’
work, including years of work experience, tenure in
their current organization, the industry their orga-
nization belonged to, their organization’s size, and
participants’ job satisfaction. We also asked partici-
pants to indicate the duties they perform as part of
their work, including whether they engaged in ne-
gotiations. In addition, the Time 1 survey inquired
about participants’ personal situation, including
measures of participants’mating motivation and the
control variables, ostensibly to allow us to assess
their work–life balance.
A total of 150 participants who responded to the
Time 1 survey indicated engaging in negotiation as
part of their work. We invited only those who
responded that they negotiate as part of their work to
participate in the Time 2 survey. These participants
were paid £10 to complete the study. The remaining
162 participants, who indicated not engaging in any
negotiation activities as part of their work, were not
invited to participate in the Time 2 survey, and as
compensation for participating in the Time 1 survey
only, were entered into a raffle of five prizes of £20
each. All participants were given an option of per-
sonally collecting their remuneration at the lab or
receiving it in the form of vouchers for an online
retailer.
Of the 150 participants invited to participate in
the Time 2 survey, 141 accepted the invitation. Par-
ticipants received the Time 2 survey a week after
having taken the Time 1 survey. The Time 2 survey
contained the measure of our dependent variable,
participants’ tendency to behave unethically in
negotiation. The independent and dependent mea-
sures were collected at two different points in time
to reduce common method bias (Podsakoff,
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). In addition, by
using two time-separated data collections with two
different cover stories, we sought to minimize the
risk of demand effects.
The final sample consisted of 138 employed adults
who provided complete responses. Participants
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were 52.9% female and, on average, 32.98 years old
(SD 5 8.74). They came from different industries,
including educational services (26.81%), pro-
fessional, scientific, or technical services (15.22%),
arts, entertainment, and recreation (8.70%), finance
and insurance (7.25%), health care (5.80%), and re-
tail trade (5.07%). The size of participants’ organi-
zation ranged from very small (1–4 employees) to
large (over 1,000 employees), with an average in the
category of 100 to 249 employees. Work experience
ranged from 1 to 41 years (mean5 10.30, SD5 8.15).
Measures
Mating motivation. Participants were asked to
indicate the degree to which they were interested in
pursuing various non-work activities (e.g., “artistic
activities,” “charitable activities”) on a scale ranging
from15 “not at all” to 55 “extremely.”Among these
items we embedded the item “romantic/sexual ac-
tivities,” developed and used in prior research to
measure participants’ mating motivation (Baker &
Maner, 2008). The key benefit of this measure is that
because of a strong cover story focused on work
versus personal life, and because it is embedded
among other similar items inquiring about personal
interests, it is unlikely to evoke suspicion. For this
reason, we also remained consistent with prior re-
search in using a short but face-valid measure.
Unethical negotiation behavior. We measured
this construct using the 16-item unethical negotia-
tion strategies scale (Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue,
2000). The items in this scale were inductively de-
veloped based on different sources of information on
the types of unethical behaviors that tended to occur
in managerial negotiations. Participants were asked
to indicate on a 7-point scale (1 5 “never” to 7 5
“always”) the frequency with which they engaged in
several unethical negotiation tactics given an op-
portunity to do so. In case they never had an oppor-
tunity to engage in a behavior described, an “n/a”
option was available. Sample items are “In-
tentionally misrepresent information to your oppo-
nent in order to strengthen your negotiating
arguments or position” and “In return for conces-
sions from your opponent now, offer to make future
concessions which you know you will not follow
through on;” a 5 .89.
Control variables. We controlled for several var-
iables thatmight be related tomatingmotivation and
unethical behavior. Age has been shown to be rele-
vant to mating motivation and the concomitant
intrasexual competition behavior (Wilson & Daly,
1985) as well as unethical behavior (Kish-Gephart
et al., 2010), so we controlled for respondents’ age.
Personal power has been linked with both sex-
ual goals (Kunstman & Maner, 2011) as well as the
propensity to behave unethically (Kipnis, 1972).
Therefore, we measured participants’ power using
four itemsof theSense of Power scale (Anderson, John,
& Keltner, 2012; Sivanathan & Pettit, 2010). Sample
items are: “I think I have a great deal of power” and “If I
want to, I get to make the decisions;” a 5 .72.
Status has similarly been suggested as an impor-
tant variable in mating dynamics (Buss, 1989), as
well as a variable that might affect people’s pro-
pensity to engage in unethical behavior (Piff,
Stancato, Coˆte´, Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012).
We therefore used a 5-item measure taken from
Anderson, Kraus, Galinsky, and Keltner (2012) to
measure respondents’ status. Sample items are “I
have high social standing” and “I am held in high
regard by others;” a 5 .88.
Becausemoodmayaffect sexualmotivation (Lykins,
Janssen, & Graham, 2006) as well as the propensity to
behave unethically (Craciun, 2006), we asked partici-
pants to indicate what their mood was like generally
using the PANAS (Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule) measure (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).
Participants indicated using 5-point scales ranging
from 15 “definitely do not feel” to 55 “extremely” to
what extent they generally experienced 10 positive
(e.g., “active,” “inspired;” a 5 .90) and 10 negative
emotions (“afraid,” “guilty;” a 5 .91).
We also measured job satisfaction following a simi-
lar rationale as mood. Respondents indicated how
satisfied they were with their job (1 5 “strongly dis-
agree,” 5 5 “strongly agree”) using the 5-item job sat-
isfaction index by Brayfield and Rothe (1951); a5 .86.
Finally, because religiosity may affect sexual de-
sire (Halpern, Udry, Campbell, Suchindran, &
Mason, 1994) and has been found to be relevant for
unethical conduct (Bloodgood, Turnley, &Mudrack,
2008), we asked respondents whether they consid-
ered themselves to be religious (05 “no,” 15 “yes”).
STUDY 1: RESULTS
The means, standard deviations, internal consis-
tency of the measures, and correlations among vari-
ables are presented in Table 1.
Hypothesis 1a Test: Effects of Mating Motivation
We used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
analysis to test our predictions. In addition, as
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a robustness check, we reanalyzed the data by: (1)
usingmultilevel regression analysis with industry as
the nesting variable; (2) adding additional organiza-
tional (e.g., organizational size) and personal
(e.g., interest in pursuing other work-unrelated in-
terests) control variables for which we did not have
a theoretical basis to include them in the main
analysis; (3) removing all control variables. All
results reported below remained substantively
unchanged.
As displayed in Table 2, participants’ sex, mating
motivation, their interaction, and all the control
variables were entered in a model predicting par-
ticipants’ unethical negotiation behavior. The pre-
dicted interaction between participant sex and
matingmotivationonunethical negotiationbehavior
was significant, b 5 0.23, p 5 .014. To interpret the
interaction, we first investigated the effect of mating
motivation among men versus women. Figure 1 de-
picts these conditional effects.
The analysis of conditional effects showed that
matingmotivation was associated with higher levels
of unethical negotiation behavior among men, b 5
0.20, p5 .005, but not women, b5 20.03, p5 .614.
These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1a;
supporting the reasoning that the greater level of
unethical behavior in men compared to women is in
part a consequence of evolved tendencies for intra-
sexual competition for mates.
Hypothesis 1b Test: Sex Differences
Next, we examined whether and when men ne-
gotiate more unethically than women. If the effect of
TABLE 1
Study 1a: Variable Means, Standard Deviations, Internal Consistencies,b and Correlationsc
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Unethical negotiation behavior 2.92 0.58 (.89)
2. Mating motivation 3.57 1.05 0.18
3. Sex 0.47 0.50 0.08 0.10
4. Age 14.98 8.74 20.09 20.14 0.20
5. Power 3.27 0.45 0.20 0.07 0.03 20.03 (.72)
6. Status 3.49 0.61 0.01 0.09 0.10 20.14 0.57 (.88)
7. Positive affect 3.73 0.58 0.05 0.10 20.09 20.05 0.39 0.58 (.90)
8. Negative affect 2.19 0.72 0.12 20.01 20.05 20.29 0.02 20.09 20.30 (.91)
9. Job satisfaction 3.49 0.56 20.07 20.04 20.08 0.10 0.13 0.25 0.34 20.24 (.86)
10. Religiousness 1.48 0.50 20.06 20.14 0.06 20.09 0.12 0.1 0.16 0.04 0.06
a N 5 138.
b Internal consistency statistics (Cronbach’s alphas) are displayed on the diagonal.
c Correlations greater than |.17| are significant at the .05 level.
TABLE 2
Study 1: Results from OLS Regression Analysis of Unethical Negotiation Behaviora
Variablesb b SE t p>t LLCI ULCI
Constant 2.05 0.57 3.60 ,0.001 0.93 3.17
Mating motivation (A) 20.03 0.06 20.51 0.614 20.15 0.09
Sexb (B) 20.72 0.35 22.00 0.045 21.42 20.01
A 3 B 0.23 0.09 2.50 0.014 0.05 0.42
Age ,0.01 0.01 20.60 0.547 20.02 0.01
Power 0.38 0.13 2.90 0.004 0.13 0.64
Status 20.18 0.11 21.60 0.115 20.40 0.04
Positive affect 0.11 0.11 1.00 0.307 20.11 0.34
Negative affect 0.08 0.07 1.10 0.285 20.07 0.23
Job satisfaction 20.03 0.09 20.36 0.720 20.21 0.15
Religiousness 20.11 0.10 21.10 0.265 20.30 0.08
a N 5 138. LLCI 5 95% confidence interval lower limit; ULCI5 95% confidence interval upper limit.
b Sex was coded 1 for men and 0 for women.
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mating motivation documented above is one expla-
nation for why men in some (but not all) cases ne-
gotiate more unethically than women, then there
should be a significant sex difference in the pro-
pensity to negotiate unethically, such that men ne-
gotiatemore unethically, but primarily whenmating
motivation is high rather than low.
The analysis of conditional effects confirmed that
men negotiated more unethically than women, but
only when mating motivation was high (1 SD above
themean),b50.36,p5 .009, but notwhen itwas low
(1 SD below the mean), b 5 20.13, p 5 .377. These
results show that the level of mating motivation is
one important boundary condition explaining when
and why men negotiate more unethically than
women, supporting Hypothesis 1b.
STUDY 2: EXPERIMENT
Study 2 sought to bolster the internal validity of
our conclusions by experimentally manipulating
mating motivation and examining how it affects
unethical negotiation behavior in a controlled set-
ting. The experiment also tested the validity of our
theory by specifying two boundary conditions under
which we would expect to find sex differences in
unethical behavior. Findings of sex differences
within the theoretically generated boundary condi-
tions should provide support for our theory andmay
suggest how the greater male propensity to behave
unethically could be tempered. The first boundary
condition that we examine is the opponent’s sex. If
the higher level of unethical negotiation behavior
among men arises as a response evolved to succeed
in intrasexual competition formates, thenwe should
see the higher level of unethical negotiation behavior
only when men negotiate with other men, but not
when they negotiate with women.
The second boundary condition we examine is
opponent attractiveness. Attractive men present
more formidable mating competitors than unattrac-
tive men because they are relatively more desirable
to women (Buss, 2008; Ford & Beach, 1951; Maner,
Gailliot, Rouby, & Miller, 2007; Sugiyama, 2005).
Consequently, men should exhibit more unethical
negotiation behavior when negotiating with more
rather than less attractive male opponents. Taken
together, evidence of these two boundary conditions
would provide support for our theory by demon-
strating that the effect varies as a function of variables
that are relevant to intrasexual competition.
We test our theory by analyzing unethical negoti-
ation behavior as a function of Study 2 variables
(participant sex, mating motivation, opponent sex,
and opponent attractiveness) to examine the effect of
mating motivation as a function of the remaining
situational factors. Our theory implies a four-way
interaction among these factors whereby the three-
way interaction amongmatingmotivation, opponent
sex, and opponent attractiveness is significant pri-
marily among male participants, such that mating
motivation increases the level of unethical behavior,
but onlywhen the opponent ismale, andparticularly
an attractive male. In contrast, the three-way in-
teraction among mating motivation, opponent sex,
and opponent attractiveness should be weaker
among female participants, such that mating moti-
vation has a weaker effect among women regardless
FIGURE 1
Study 1: Simple Effects of Mating Motivation among Women and Men
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of the sex or attractiveness of the negotiation oppo-
nent. This pattern of findings would provide evi-
dence for the argument that unethical behavior is in
part a consequence of evolved tendencies for intra-
sexual competition, but primarily in men. We
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2a. Mating motivation makes men,
more than women, negotiate more unethically,
particularly when negotiating with other men,
and not women, and particularly when the
opposing male is attractive, rather than
unattractive.
Aswith our reasoning for Hypothesis 1b, we could
use our study to examine whether our theory helps
explain the heterogeneity in sex differences in un-
ethical behavior. This will require an examination of
the effect of participant sex as a function of the
remaining Study 2 variables (mating motivation,
opponent sex, and opponent attractiveness). The
four-way interaction among the Study 2 variables
implied by our theory predicts that the three-way
interaction among participant sex, opponent sex,
and opponent attractiveness is significant when
matingmotivation is activated, such thatmen engage
in more unethical behavior than women, but only
when the opponent is of the same sex, and particu-
larly when the opponent is attractive. In contrast,
when mating motivation is not activated, the three-
way interaction among participant sex, opponent
sex, and opponent attractiveness should be weak-
ened, such that men are less likely to engage in more
unethical behavior thanwomen regardless of the sex
or attractiveness of the opponent. This pattern of
findings would illustrate conditions under which
sex differences in unethical behavior are stronger
versus weaker, thus helping explain the heteroge-
neity in sex differences in unethical behavior. We
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2b. Men negotiate more unethically
than women, but primarily when mating moti-
vation is high, when the opponent is of the same
sex, and particularly when the opponent is
attractive.
Participants and Design
We recruited 317 participants from a subject pool
maintained by the same business school behavioral
laboratory through which Study 1 data collection
was executed. Therewere no overlapping subjects in
the two studies. Study 2 participants were offered
£10, ostensibly to participate in two studies, one on
facial recognition and one on negotiation. In reality,
the study on facial recognition served as a cover story
for our mating motivation manipulation, described
below.
Because we again sought to examine unethical
negotiation behavior among both men and women,
we recruited roughly the same number of partici-
pants of each sex (50.2%men, 49.8%women) using
the approach described in Study 1. The average age
of participants was 28.12 years (SD 5 8.44), 81.4%
had prior work experience, and 52.1% indicated
having experience negotiating at work. Participants
of each sex were randomly assigned to conditions of
a 2 (opponent sex: same vs. opposite) 3 2 (mating
motivation: activated vs. not activated) 3 2 (oppo-
nent attractiveness: attractive vs. unattractive)
between-subjects design.
Procedure and Materials
Sign-up questionnaire. Interested participants
were asked to complete a short sign-up question-
naire. Participants reported their sex, age, negotia-
tion experience, and educational attainment.
Participants were also asked to upload a head-and-
shoulders picture. They were told that the reasonwe
asked for this information and their picture was so
that we could assemble profiles of participants who
would be negotiating among each other in the lab
experiment a week later. This sign-up questionnaire
thus served as a cover story for the pictures of the
negotiation opponents that would be shown to par-
ticipants in the lab study.
The experiment.About aweek after signingup for
the study, participants came to the lab individually.
The labwhere the studywas conductedwas running
several studies simultaneously so participants could
see other people in the waiting room and around the
lab, which helped to minimize the suspicion about
the existence of negotiation opponents, who were
not real. Participants were escorted to individual
rooms and seated in front of a computer, which we
used to present all materials.
Participants were told they would take part in two
unrelated studies. The first study ostensibly focused
on facial recognition and consisted of memorizing
faces of 10 people and attempting to identify their
faces among other faces after a time delay. This
served as a cover story for our mating motivation
manipulation. The second study was on negotia-
tion, and contained the main negotiation task
within which opponent sex and attractiveness were
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manipulated. Participants were told that they would
engage in the negotiation right after memorizing
people’s faces and before the facial recognition task
because some timehad to elapse to allow formemory
decay.
Mating motivation manipulation. Following prior
research (Baker & Maner, 2008; Chang, Lu, Li, & Li,
2011; Roney, 2003; Wilson & Daly, 2004), mating
motivation was manipulated by asking participants
to carefully view and memorize 10 pictures dis-
playing faces of either attractive or unattractive
people. The pictures we used were developed in
prior research (Baker & Maner, 2008), and these re-
searchers selected them so that attractiveness ratings
(1 5 “very unattractive,” 9 5 “very attractive”) were
identical for male and female pictures (attractive
mean 5 7.98; unattractive mean 5 2.49). The logic
behind this manipulation is that because physical
appearance is a strong predictor of attraction (Buss,
2008; Ford & Beach, 1951; Sugiyama, 2005), asking
participants to view pictures of attractive individuals
should stimulate their sexual and romantic interest,
compared to viewing pictures of unattractive indi-
viduals (Baker & Maner, 2008; Chang et al., 2011;
Roney, 2003; Wilson & Daly, 2004).
Right after participants viewed the pictures, they
were asked to report their mood using the PANAS
(Watson et al., 1988), ostensibly to examine formood
effects onmemory.ThePANASaskedparticipants to
indicate their mood in the present moment using 10
adjectives for positive affect (e.g., “active,” “in-
spired;” a5 .92) and 10 for negative affect (“afraid,”
“guilty;” a 5 .93) using 5-point scales ranging from
1 5 “definitely do not feel” to 5 5 “extremely.”
We embedded two additional items among the
PANAS items to unobtrusively check the effective-
ness of our mating motivation manipulation. Fol-
lowing prior research (Maner et al., 2005), the two
adjectives were “sexual arousal” and “romantic
arousal,” and they were measured using the same
scales as the PANAS items. Therefore, the PANAS
was intended to provide a cover for themanipulation
checks andminimize the chances of suspicion about
thepurposeof the study.Wealso intended to analyze
the PANAS scores to demonstrate that any effect of
our manipulation can be attributed to differences in
the activation of participants’ mating motivation
specifically, rather than the potentially related psy-
chological states of positive or negative affect. The
two manipulation check items were highly corre-
lated (r 5 .80, p , .001), so we averaged them into
a single measure intended to check the effectiveness
of our mating motivation manipulation.
Negotiation.Next, participantswere told they and
another participant would be assigned to represent
different parties in a seller–buyer negotiation. They
were told that on the following page, they would see
which role they were assigned to, as well as the
profile of the participant representing the other role.
Participants were told that the other participant
would be able to see their profile in an equivalent
format based on the information they submitted in
the sign-up questionnaire.
Next, all participants read that they were randomly
assigned to the buyer role. At that point they reviewed
the profile of the participant theywould ostensibly be
negotiating with. The profile contained the picture of
the other participant, which constituted our manipu-
lations of opponent sex and attractiveness, described
below. The opponent was always assigned to the
role of the seller. In all conditions, the opponent’s
profile indicated the gender-neutral name “Morgan
Tomlinson.” We indicated 21 as the opponent’s
age, “Undergraduate, King’s College London” as ed-
ucational attainment, and no work or negotiation ex-
perience. The information about the opponent’s
background was identical across conditions.
Opponent sex and attractiveness manipulation.
The materials for our manipulation of opponent at-
tractiveness were taken from prior work on facial
attractiveness, where they have been widely used
(Braun, Gruendl, Marberger, & Scherber, 2001; Van
Leeuwen, Veling, Van Baaren, & Dijksterhuis, 2009).
Specifically, we used four images that were
computer-generated to manipulate attractiveness
while keeping numerous image features constant,
including hair, skin, background, and contrast (for
details, seeBraunet al., 2001).Aspart of theprofile of
the negotiation opponent, participants saw a picture
of either a male or a female, which constituted our
opponent sex manipulation, and the person shown
was either attractive or unattractive, which consti-
tuted our opponent attractiveness manipulation.
Unethical negotiation measure. After reviewing
the profile of the opponent, participants were pro-
videdwith thedetailsof thenegotiationcase, basedon
the Bullard Houses case (Karp, Gold, & Tan, 1998),
widely used in prior research on unethical negotia-
tion behavior (e.g., Haselhuhn & Wong, 2011; Jap,
Robertson, & Hamilton, 2011; Kern & Chugh, 2009;
Lee & Thompson, 2011). Participants were told they
would negotiate on behalf of a hotel group wishing to
purchase a historic property from its owner. The
owner was said to strongly disfavor a commercial use
of theproperty.However, this isexactlywhat thehotel
group had in mind. Therefore, the case creates the
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incentive for the negotiator to lie about the intended
use of the property. Participants were told that the
other participant, negotiating on behalf of the seller,
was first interested in learning what the intended use
of the propertywas, andwould later consider anoffer.
Participants were reminded that they were not obli-
gated to be truthful about the intended use but that
they were not obligated to lie either. All participants
then wrote a message communicating the purported
planned use of the property.
Consistentwithprior research (Haselhuhn&Wong,
2011; Jap et al., 2011; Kern & Chugh, 2009; Lee &
Thompson, 2011), two coders, blind to conditions,
coded participants’ responses for “whether the buyer
explicitly deceived the seller” (Haselhuhn & Wong,
2011). Deception was defined as intentional acts of
deceit that benefit the buyer (Mitchell, 1986;
Schweitzer et al., 2006).A total of 136 of the responses
(44.6%) were coded as deception and 169 (53.3%) as
truthful communication. In addition, 12 cases were
coded as non-responses, most reflecting a mis-
understanding of the case or incompletely written
messages, and so were not classified as either truth or
lie. Differences in coding were few andwere resolved
through discussion. After communicating the inten-
ded use of the property, participants were told the
study was over, thoroughly debriefed, and paid.
STUDY 2: RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
The manipulation check for the mating motivation
manipulation revealed an interaction between the
mating motivation manipulation and sex, F1,313 5
5.94, p 5 0.015. Simple effects analysis showed that
themanipulationhad the intendedeffect for bothmen
(p , .001) and women (p 5 .009), such that partici-
pants reported a higher level of sexual/romantic
arousal when mating motivation was activated
(men: mean5 2.43, SD5 1.02; women: mean5 1.77,
SD5 0.82) than when it was not (men: mean 5 1.63,
SD 5 0.78; women: mean 5 1.42, SD 5 0.61). Thus,
while themanipulation affectedmen somewhatmore
strongly than women, it produced the intended ef-
fect in both sexes. The manipulation did not influ-
ence participants’ affect (positive affect: t315 5 0.61,
p5 .542; negative affect: t3155 0.74, p5 .462).
Hypothesis 2a Test: Effects of Mating Motivation
We entered participant sex (0 5 women; 1 5
men), mating motive condition (0 5 not activated;
1 5 activated), opponent sex (0 5 opposite-sex; 1 5
same-sex),andopponentattractiveness(05unattractive;
1 5 attractive) and all higher-order interactions in a lo-
gistic regression model predicting participants’ negotia-
tion decisions (05 ethical; 15 unethical).1
The analysis results are displayed in Table 3, and
Figure 2 shows percentages of unethical negotiation
behavior by condition. The predicted four-way in-
teraction was significant, b 5 5.23, p 5 .007. To in-
terpret the four-way interaction,we first investigated
the effect of mating motivation among men versus
women by unpacking the simple three-way in-
teraction between mating motivation, opponent sex,
and opponent attractiveness for male and female
participants separately. The upper portion of Table 4
contains numerical percentages of deception be-
havior by condition, simple effects of mating moti-
vation, and all relevant simple three- and two-way
interactions.
Male participants. For male participants, the
three-way interaction between mating motivation,
opponent sex, and opponent attractiveness was sig-
nificant, b5 3.29, p5 .021. When male participants
negotiated with a female opponent, the effect of the
mating motivation manipulation did not vary as
a function of opponent attractiveness (simplemating
motivation 3 opponent attractiveness interaction:
b520.14,p5 .532);matingmotivationhadnoeffect
on participants’ unethical negotiation behavior re-
gardless of the attractiveness of the opponent (see
Table 4 for details of simple effects of mating moti-
vation within each condition).
However, whenmale participants negotiated with
a male opponent, the effect of the mating motivation
manipulation significantly varied as a function of
opponent attractiveness (simple mating motivation
3 opponent attractiveness interaction: b 5 0.61,
p5 .005), such that mating motivation had no effect
on participants’ unethical negotiation behavior when
the opponent was unattractive, b 5 20.24, p 5 .157.
However, when the opponent was attractive,
mating motivation made male participants negoti-
ate more unethically with their male opponents,
b 5 0.37, p 5 .006.
1 We did not include controls in our analyses for Study 2
as we did in Study 1. In Study 1, we needed to control for
other potential effects on unethical behavior as all of the
variables were measured. In Study 2, we randomly
assigned participants to conditions, and therefore differ-
ences in unethical behavior between conditions could
only be due to condition. We thank the reviewer who
prompted this clarification.
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Female participants. In contrast, for female par-
ticipants, the three-way interaction between mating
motivation, opponent sex, and opponent attractive-
ness was not significant, b 5 21.95, p 5 .146.
When female participants negotiated with a male
opponent, the effect of the mating motivation manipu-
lation did not vary as a function of the opponent at-
tractiveness (simple mating motivation 3 opponent
TABLE 3
Study 2: Results from Logistic Regression Analysis of Unethical Negotiation Behaviora
Variablesb b SE z p>z LLCI ULCI
Constant 20.15 0.39 20.39 0.695 20.93 0.62
Participant sex (A) 20.32 0.69 20.46 0.648 21.67 1.04
Mating motivation (B) 20.54 0.64 20.85 0.397 21.79 0.71
Opponent sex (C) 20.21 0.59 20.36 0.715 21.36 0.93
Opponent attractiveness (D) 0.15 0.66 0.23 0.816 21.15 1.45
A 3 B 0.72 0.96 0.75 0.453 21.16 2.61
A 3 C 0.68 0.98 0.70 0.484 21.23 2.60
A 3 D 1.11 0.89 1.24 0.214 20.64 2.85
B 3 C 20.30 0.99 20.31 0.760 22.25 1.64
B 3 D 0.41 0.98 0.41 0.679 21.51 2.32
C 3 D 22.32 1.37 21.70 0.090 25.00 0.36
A 3 B 3 C 21.07 1.43 20.75 0.454 23.86 1.73
A 3 B 3 D 0.58 0.90 0.64 0.520 21.19 2.35
A 3 C 3 D 20.87 1.35 20.65 0.518 23.53 1.78
B 3 C 3 D 21.95 1.34 21.45 0.146 24.57 0.68
A 3 B 3 C 3 D 5.23 1.96 2.68 0.007 1.40 9.07
a N5 305. Dependent variable was negotiation responses, coded 1 for unethical and 0 for ethical behavior. LLCI5 95% confidence interval
lower limit; ULCI5 95% confidence interval upper limit.
b Participant sex was coded 1 for men and 0 for women; mating motivation was coded 1 for the mating motivation activated condition and
0 for the mating motivation not activated condition; opponent sex was coded 1 for same-sex opponents and 0 for opposite-sex opponents;
opponent attractiveness was coded 1 for attractive opponents and 0 for unattractive opponents.
FIGURE 2
Study 2: Percentage of Participants Who Negotiated Unethically Per Condition
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attractiveness interaction: b520.38, p5 .083), such
that it had no effect on participants’ propensity to
negotiate unethically regardless of the attractiveness
of the opponent. Because the interaction was close to
marginal significance, we examined the simple ef-
fects which did not reveal any meaningful effects
(ps$ .13)andthereforedonotmakefurtherconclusions
regarding this statistic.
In addition, when female participants negotiated
with a female opponent, the effect of the mating
motivation manipulation did not vary as a function
of opponent attractiveness (simple mating motiva-
tion3 opponent attractiveness interaction: b5 0.09,
p 5 .689), such that it had no effect on participants’
propensity to negotiate unethically regardless of the
attractiveness of the opponent.
Thus, the mating motivation manipulation made
men, but notwomen, negotiatemore unethically, but
only when negotiating with other men, and this ef-
fect was stronger when the male opponent was at-
tractive than when the male opponent was
unattractive (in which case the effect was not sig-
nificant). The results are consistent with Hypothesis
2a, supporting the reasoning that the greater level of
unethical behavior in men, but not in women, is in
part a consequence of evolved tendencies for intra-
sexual competition for mates.
Hypothesis 2b Test: Sex Differences
Next, we examined whether and when men ne-
gotiate more unethically than women. If the effect of
mating motivation documented above is one expla-
nation for why men in some (but not all) cases ne-
gotiate more unethically than women, then there
should be a significant sex difference in unethical
negotiation behavior, such that men negotiate more
unethically, but only when mating motivation is
activated, when the opponent is of the same sex, and
when theopponent is attractive. The lowerportionof
Table 4 contains percentages of unethical negotia-
tion behavior by condition, simple effects of partic-
ipant sex, and all relevant simple three- and two-way
interactions.
Mating motivation activated. When mating mo-
tivation was activated, the three-way interaction
between participant sex, opponent sex, and oppo-
nent attractiveness was significant, b 5 3.09,
p 5 .002. When participants negotiated with an op-
ponent of the opposite sex, the effect of participant
sex did not vary as a function of the opponent at-
tractiveness (simple participant sex 3 opponent at-
tractiveness interaction: b 5 20.31, p 5 .173), such
that there was no sex difference in unethical behav-
ior regardless of the attractiveness of the opponent
(see Table 4 for details of simple effects of participant
sex within each condition).
However, when participants negotiated with a
same-sex opponent, the effect of participant sex sig-
nificantly varied as a function of the opponent at-
tractiveness (simple participant sex 3 opponent
attractiveness interaction: b 5 0.69, p 5 .001), such
that it had no effect on participants’ propensity to
negotiate unethically when the opponent was
unattractive, b 5 20.29, p 5 .056, but when the
opponent was attractive, men were more likely
to negotiate unethically than women, b 5 0.41,
p 5 .005.
Mating motivation not activated. In contrast,
whenmatingmotivationwasnot activated, the three-
way interaction between participant sex, opponent
sex, and opponent attractivenesswas not significant,
b 5 20.87, p 5 .518. When participants negotiated
with an opponent of the opposite sex, the effect of
participant sex did not vary as a function of the
opponent attractiveness (simple participant sex 3
opponent attractiveness interaction: b 5 20.07, p 5
.760), such that it had no effect on participants’
propensity to negotiate unethically regardless of the
attractiveness of the opponent.
In addition, when participants negotiated with
a same-sex opponent, the effect of participant sex
also did not significantly vary as a function of the
opponent attractiveness (simple participant sex 3
opponent attractiveness interaction: b 5 20.29,
p5 .195), such that it alsohadnoeffect onparticipants’
propensity to negotiate unethically regardless of the
attractiveness of the opponent.
Thus, men negotiated more unethically than
women, but only when their mating motivation was
activated and when they negotiated with a same-sex
opponent, and this effect was stronger when the
same-sex opponent was attractive than when the
opponent was unattractive (in which case the effect
was not significant). These results support Hypoth-
esis 2b and demonstrate that the level of mating
motivation may explain when and why men nego-
tiate more unethically than women.
STUDY 3: EXPERIMENT
Study 1 and Study 2 together establish that the
differential effect ofmatingmotivation inmenversus
women explains men’s greater propensity to engage
in unethical behavior. In Study 3, we sought to in-
vestigate inmoredetail implications of our theory for
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the effects of mating motivation on unethical nego-
tiation behavior in men as well as women. The re-
sults of Study 2 suggest that women also are affected
by mating motivation (demonstrated by the effec-
tiveness of the manipulation), however both Study 1
and 2 show that mating motivation did not affect
women’s unethical negotiation behavior. Kennedy
and Kray (2015) note that many conclusions about
sex differences in negotiation might be due to the
kinds of behaviors investigated, rather than differ-
ences in ability ormotivationbetween the sexes:men
and women might opt for different behaviors to ac-
complish the same goal. Drawing on our overarching
framework of parental investment theory, in Study 3,
we examined whether mating motivation might also
prompt unethical behavior among women when
unethical behavior constituted less of a severe vio-
lation of the norms of socially appropriate behavior.
Unethical behaviors vary in degree of social ac-
ceptability (Jones, 1991), where some unethical be-
haviors (e.g., telling outright lies) constitute more
severe violations of the norms of socially acceptable
behavior than others (e.g., deflecting a question). As
noted in our theory, to the extent that people engaged
in behavior that violated the norms of socially ac-
ceptable behavior, they faced potential fitness costs
due to social sanctions (Fehr & Ga¨chter, 2002). The
more severe the violation of the norms of socially ac-
ceptable conduct, themore negatively people react to
the unethical act (Jones, 1991). Evolutionarily, such
costs were lower for men because women had amore
important role in the taking care of offspring and thus
any social repercussions that might arise from un-
ethical behavior used to outperform intrasexual
competitors was more costly in terms of the ability of
a gene pool to be passed down to subsequent gener-
ations (Campbell, 1999; Griskevicius et al., 2009).
This logic implies that the more severe the viola-
tion of the norms of socially acceptable behavior
(which are associated with increasing social costs,
which should be a stronger deterrent to women), the
more pronounced should be the sex difference in
norm violations. This logic informs an interesting
boundary condition for the effect of mating motiva-
tion on unethical behavior:Matingmotivationmight
more strongly prompt men to engage in unethical
behaviorwhich constitutesmore severe violations of
the norms of socially appropriate behavior. How-
ever, for unethical behaviors that constitute less se-
vere violations of the norms of socially appropriate
behavior (and which are thus associated with lower
costs of negative third-party reactions), the sex dif-
ference might be less pronounced. Put differently,
mating motivation might prompt unethical behavior
among both men and women—attenuating the sex
difference in unethical behavior—when the behav-
ior constitutes a less severe violation of the norms of
socially appropriate behavior. This reasoning is
supported by aggression research, which suggests
that compared to men, women engage in less direct
aggression (e.g., physically assaulting someone) but
not in less indirect aggression (e.g., rumor spreading;
Archer & Coyne, 2005). This evolutionary account
also bolsters socialization accounts that suggest that
there are higher moral expectations for women.
We test this implication of our theory in Study 3 by
experimentally varying whether the negotiation sit-
uation afforded the opportunity for unethical be-
havior that constituted a more versus less severe
violation of the norms of socially acceptable behav-
ior. In so doing, we extend the applicability of our
theory to women and test another meaningful
boundary condition that explains heterogeneity in
sex differences in unethical behavior. Because we
found no meaningful cross-sex effects in Study 2, in
Study 3we simplified the design by looking at same-
sex dyads only. Thus, in the context of this design,
our hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 3a. When unethical negotiation be-
havior constitutes a more (compared to less)
severe transgression of the norms of socially
acceptable behavior, the sex difference in the
effect of mating motivation on unethical be-
havior (particularly with an attractive oppo-
nent) is pronounced (attenuated).
Hypothesis 3b. When unethical negotiation be-
havior constitutes a more (compared to less)
severe transgression of the norms of socially
acceptable behavior, the sex difference in un-
ethical negotiation (when mating motivation is
high and when the opponent is attractive) is
pronounced (attenuated).
Study 3 was also designed to further test the ro-
bustness of our findings. One of the concerns with
our findings in Study 2 was that while the manipu-
lation was successful in producing the predicted
difference in mating motivation, the means in the
manipulation check were below the midpoint of the
scale. Therefore, in Study 3 we changed the manip-
ulation paradigm to strengthen the manipulated
mating motivation. Finally, we explored additional
potential boundary conditions of our effect: marital
status and sexual orientation. Regarding marital
status, mating motivation may decrease when
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individuals are already in a committed relationship.
While the literature suggests that this may not nec-
essarily be the case (Simpson &Gangestad, 1991),we
measured marital status to explore this possibility.
With regards to sexual orientation, because our
mating motivation manipulation was based on het-
erosexual preferences (i.e., men for women, and
women for men), we measured sexual orientation to
test whether it moderates the effects. Finally, we also
measured participants’ status striving and envy to
examine whether these states play a role in the
phenomenon we examine because both might be
associated with mating dynamics as well as com-
petitive behavior.
Participants and Design
We recruited 375 participants from a subject pool
maintainedby abehavioral lab of a different business
school from Study 1 and 2. Participants were offered
10V to participate in the session, ostensibly to par-
ticipate in two studies, one on rating print adver-
tisements and one on negotiation. The study on print
advertisements served as a cover story for ourmating
motivation manipulation, described below.
Again, we recruited roughly the same number of
participants of each sex (49.6%men, 50.4%women).
The average age of the participants was 22.31 years
(SD 5 2.83), 85.3% had prior work experience, and
22.1% indicated having experience with negotiat-
ing. Participants of each sexwere randomly assigned
to conditions of a 2 (mating motivation: activated vs.
not activated)3 2 (opponent attractiveness: attractive
vs. unattractive)3 2 (unethical negotiation behavior:
deceive vs. dodge) between-subjects design. The last
factor manipulated whether the negotiation situation
afforded the opportunity to engage in an unethical
behavior that constituted a more (outright deception)
versus less (dodging the question) severe violation of
the norms of socially acceptable behavior.
Procedure and Materials
The sign-up questionnaire. As in Study 2, par-
ticipantswere asked to fill in a sign-up questionnaire
prior to coming into the lab for the main study. The
cover story was the same as Study 2, where partici-
pants were told that these pictures would be used to
assemble profiles of participants who would be ne-
gotiating among each other in the lab experiment. In
the sign-up questionnaire, participants were asked
demographics questions (e.g., sex, age, negotiation
experience, educational attainment) and were also
asked to upload a head-and-shoulders picture. Par-
ticipants were also asked to report their relationship
status (63.8% single, 34.6% in a relationship, 1.6%
other). We examined the open-ended responses to
the “other” responses and found they all referred to
some sort of partnership. Therefore, we combined
this category with the relationship category to create
a binary (0 5 single; 1 5 has a partner). Finally,
participants were also asked to report their sexuality
(7-point scale, 1 5 “exclusively heterosexual” to
7 5 “exclusively homosexual”).
The experiment. The lab experiment for Study 3
followed a similar procedure as that of Study 2.
Participants were told that they would take part in
two unrelated studies. The first study contained the
mating motivation manipulation, and the second
study contained the main negotiation task within
which opponent sex and attractiveness were ma-
nipulated. Below we elaborate on the changes made
to Study 3.
Mating motivation manipulation. We adopted
a manipulation procedure from Van den Bergh,
Dewitte, and Warlop (2008) to manipulate mating
motivation. Participants were asked to carefully
view and rate 15 print advertisements on how at-
tractive they found each of the advertisements on
a 5-point scale (1 5 “not at all attractive,” 5 5 “very
attractive”). The pictures used were actual print ad-
vertisements displaying either images of nature
(control condition) or images of opposite-sex un-
derwear models (i.e., men saw female models,
women saw male models).
The same manipulation check from Study 2 was
used where participants were asked to report their
mood using the PANAS with the two additional
embedded items (“sexual arousal” and “romantic
arousal”) measured on the 5-point scale.
Negotiation.As in Study 2, participants were told
they and another participant would be assigned to
represent different parties in a seller–buyer negoti-
ation. They were shown a profile of the participant
representing the other role and told that the other
participant would be able to see their profile in an
equivalent format using the information they sub-
mitted in the sign-up questionnaire. All participants
were assigned to the buyer role and reviewed the
profile of the participant they would ostensibly be
negotiating with, which contained the same profiles
and pictures used in Study 2.
Unethical negotiation measure. Participants were
provided with the details of the negotiation case,
again based on the Bullard Houses case (Karp et al.,
1998). As described in detail in Study 2, the case
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creates an incentive for the negotiator to lie about the
intended use of the property. Participants were told
that the other participant was first interested in
learning what the intended use of the property was.
Instead of having participants write their own mes-
sages like in Study 2, all participants were told that in
the interest of time, they would be provided with
options for the first message they would send to the
opponent to get the conversation moving.
For participants in the deception condition, the
two options that were provided included one truth-
ful message (“The client I represent is not looking to
maintain the original use of the Bullard Houses
property as luxury residences. However, I’msurewe
will be able to discuss the matter and come to an
agreement”) and one deceptivemessage (“The client
I represent is very interested in developing the
Bullard Houses property into luxury residences in
accordance with your wishes. I’m sure we will be
able to discuss the matter and come to an agree-
ment”). For participants in the dodging condition,
the two options that were provided included the
same truthful message as above and one dodging
message (“The client I represent is very interested in
the Bullard Houses property and is willing to make
a very attractive offer. I’m sure we will be able to
discuss the matter and come to an agreement”).
To examine whether third-party observers would
construe dodging versus deception as differing in
how severe of a violation of the norms of socially
acceptable behavior the two behaviors were, an in-
dependent sample of online participants (N 5 88)
rated descriptions of deception and dodging from
our study (15 “not at all severe,” 55 “very severe”).
As intended, deception (mean 5 4.01, SD 5 0.94)
was seen as a more severe violation of the norms of
socially acceptable behavior than dodging the ques-
tion (mean5 2.86, SD5 1.01), t875 11.75, p, .001.
Additional measures. As mentioned above, we
included additional measures in Study 3 to test the
robustness of our findings.
Participantswereasked to report theirmarital status
(i.e., single, in a relationship, married without chil-
dren, married with children). For heterosexual pref-
erence,weused theKinsey Scale (Kinsey, Pomeroy, &
Martin, 1948), where participants indicated on
a 7-point scale (1 5 “exclusively heterosexual,” 4 5
“bisexual,” 75 “exclusively homosexual”).
To measure envy, we used the 9-item episodic
envy scale (Cohen-Charash, 2009; Cohen-Charash &
Mueller, 2007). Sample items are: “I want what my
opponent has” and “I feel some hatred toward my
opponent;” a 5 .82.
Finally, wemeasured status striving by adapting the
five items in the attention and direction measure of
status striving in the Motivational Orientation Inven-
tory (Barrick, Stewart, & Piotrowski, 2002). Sample
itemsare:“I focusmyattentiononbeing thebest”and“I
set personal goals for doing better thanothers;”a5 .72.
STUDY 3: RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
The mating motivation manipulation had the
intended effect, t373 5 15.25, p , .001, such that
participants reported a higher level of sexual/
romantic arousal when mating motivation was acti-
vated (mean5 3.19, SD5 1.16) than when it was not
(mean51.60,SD50.82).Wechecked to seewhether
men and women differed in the extent to which
the manipulation affected their mating motivation
and did not find a significant main effect of gender,
F1,371 5 0.13, p 5 .721, nor a significant gender
by mating motivation interaction, F1,371 5 0.01,
p 5 .909. Therefore, the manipulation was effective
for bothmen andwomen and the strength of the effect
was comparable. Again, we checked positive and
negative affect tomake sure themanipulation did not
influence participants’ affect. The results confirmed
that the manipulation did not affect more general af-
fective states (positive affect: t373 5 1.18, p 5 .238;
negative affect: t3735 0.30, p5 .767). Finally, neither
status striving (p 5 .793) nor envy (p 5 .451) were
affected by the mating motivation manipulation.
Hypothesis 3a Test: Effects of Mating Motivation
on Deception
Because the two different dependent measures,
deception and dodging, were between-subjects, we
cannot analyze them simultaneously. Therefore, we
examine the two dependentmeasures, deception and
dodging, separately. We first examine unethical be-
havior by looking at how mating motivation affects
more severe unethical negotiation tactics (deception
condition), or choosing between the truthful message
and the deceptive message. We entered participant
sex (05 women; 15men), mating motive condition
(0 5 not activated; 1 5 activated), and opponent at-
tractiveness (0 5 unattractive; 1 5 attractive) and all
higher-order interactions in a logistic regression
model predicting participants’ negotiation decisions
(05 ethical; 15 unethical).
The analysis results are displayed in Table 5, and
Figure 3 shows percentages of unethical negotiation
behavior by condition. The predicted three-way
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interaction was significant, b 5 2.84, p 5 .024. To
interpret the three-way interaction, we first in-
vestigated the effect ofmatingmotivation amongmen
versus women by unpacking the simple two-way in-
teraction between mating motivation and opponent
attractiveness for male and female participants sepa-
rately. Table 6 contains numerical percentages of
deception behavior by condition, simple effects of
mating motivation, and simple two-way interactions.
Male participants. For male participants, the in-
teraction between mating motivation and opponent
attractivenesswas significant,b50.41,p5 .031.The
effect of the mating motivation manipulation signif-
icantly varied as a function of the same-sex oppo-
nent’s attractiveness such that thematingmotivation
manipulation had no effect on male participants’
unethical negotiation behavior when the opponent
was unattractive, b 5 0.003, p5 .979, but prompted
more unethical behavior when the opponent was
attractive, b 5 0.42, p 5 .001.
Female participants. The interaction between
mating motivation and opponent attractiveness was
not significant for women, b 5 20.18, p 5 .371.
These results replicated our prior findings, show-
ing that while mating motivation prompts unethical
behavior in men, women’s unethical negotiation
behavior is not affected.
Hypothesis 3a Test: Effects of Mating Motivation
on Dodging
We examine how mating motivation affects less
severe unethical negotiation tactics by looking at
participants whowere in the dodging conditionwho
chose between the truthful message and the dodging
message. The same model was used as above. The
analysis results aredisplayed inTable 7, andFigure 2
shows percentages of unethical negotiation behavior
by condition. Consistent with predictions, unlike with
respect to deception, the three-way interactionwasnot
significant with respect to dodging, b5 0.33, p5 .842.
Table 8 contains numerical percentages of dodging
behavior by condition, simple effects of mating moti-
vation, and simple two-way interactions.
Male participants. For male participants, the ef-
fect of the mating motivation manipulation signifi-
cantly varied as a function of opponent attractiveness
such that it had no effect on male participants’ un-
ethical negotiation behavior when the opponent was
unattractive,b520.05,p5 .730, buthada significant
effect when the opponent was attractive, b 5 0.33,
p 5 .002.
Female participants. Similar to men, and in
contrast to findings for deception behavior,women’s
propensity to dodge the question varied as a function
of mating motivation. When the opponent was an
unattractive woman, mating motivation did not af-
fect dodging amongwomen, b520.01, p5 .951, but
when the opponentwas an attractivewoman,mating
motivation prompted women to dodge the question
more, b 5 0.43, p , .001.
These results demonstrate thatwhen the unethical
negotiation behavior is a less severe violation,
women high in mating motivation show a similar
pattern to men in choosing to engage in unethical
negotiation behavior.
Hypothesis 3b Test: Sex Differences in Deception
Mating motivation activated. When mating mo-
tivation was activated, the two-way interaction be-
tween participant sex and opponent attractiveness
TABLE 5
Study 3: Results from Logistic Regression Analysis of Deception Behaviora
Variablesb b SE z p>z LLCI ULCI
Constant 20.09 0.42 20.21 0.835 20.91 0.73
Participant sex (A) 0.25 0.58 0.43 0.664 20.89 1.40
Mating motivation (B) ,0.00 0.59 ,0.00 1.000 21.16 0.16
Opponent attractiveness (C) 0.66 0.59 1.12 0.261 20.49 1.82
A 3 B 0.02 0.84 0.02 0.985 21.62 1.65
A 3 C 21.00 0.83 21.21 0.228 22.62 0.62
B 3 C 20.74 0.83 20.89 0.371 22.37 0.89
A 3 B 3 C 2.84 1.26 2.25 0.024 0.37 5.31
a N 5 189. Dependent variable was negotiation response selection, coded 1 for deception and 0 for ethical (truthful) message selection.
LLCI 5 95% confidence interval lower limit; ULCI 5 95% confidence interval upper limit.
b Participant sex was coded 1 for men and 0 for women; mating motivation was coded 1 for the mating motivation activated condition and
0 for the mating motivation not activated condition; opponent attractiveness was coded 1 for attractive opponents and 0 for unattractive
opponents.
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FIGURE 3
Study 3: Percentage of Participants Who Used Deception Per Condition
Study 3: Percentage of Participants Who Used Dodging Per Condition
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wasmarginally significant, b5 0.35, p5 .069.When
the opponent was unattractive, men and women did
not differ in their likelihood to engage in deception,
b5 0.07,p5 .651. However,when the opponentwas
attractive, men chose to deceive significantly more
than women, b 5 0.42, p 5 .001.
Mating motivation not activated. When mating
motivation was not activated, the two-way in-
teraction between participant sex and opponent at-
tractiveness was not significant, b520.25, p5 .225.
Menandwomendidnot differ in choosing todeceive
their opponent.
Hypothesis 3b Test: Sex Differences in Dodging
Mating motivation activated. When mating mo-
tivation was activated, the two-way interaction be-
tween participant sex and opponent attractiveness
was not significant, b 5 20.02, p 5 .881. For less
severe unethical behavior, women and men did not
differ in their propensity to behave unethically.
Mating motivation not activated. Similar to our
findings in Study 2,men andwomendid not differ in
their decisions to act unethically when mating mo-
tivation was not activated. The two-way interaction
TABLE 6
Study 3: Deception Negotiation Behaviors by Condition, Simple Effects of the Mating Motivation Manipulation (Above) and
Participant Gender (Below)a
% of Participants who Used Deception Simple Effects Simple Two-Way Interactions
Participant
sex
Opponent
attractiveness
Mating motivation
not activated
Mating motivation
activated
Simple effect of mating
motivation
Mating motivation3
opponent attractiveness
Male Unattractive 54.2% 54.5% b 5 0.003, p 5 .979 b 5 0.41, p5 .031
Attractive 45.8% 87.5% b 5 0.42, p 5 .001
Female Unattractive 47.8% 47.8% b5 0.00, p 5 1.00 b5 20.18, p5 .371
Attractive 64.0% 45.8% b 520.18, p 5 .194
% of Participants who
Used Deception
Simple Effects
Simple Two-Way
Interactions
Mating
motivation
Opponent
attractiveness Women Men
Simple effect of
participant sex
Participant sex3
opponent attractiveness
Activated Unattractive 47.8% 54.5% b 5 0.07, p5 .651 b 5 0.35, p5 .069
Attractive 45.8% 87.5% b 5 0.42, p 5 .001
Not activated Unattractive 47.8% 54.2% b 5 0.06, p5 .663 b5 20.25, p5 .225
Attractive 64.0% 45.8% b5 20.18, p 5 .194
a Variables were coded the same as described in Table 3.
TABLE 7
Study 3: Results from Logistic Regression Analysis of Dodging Behaviora
Variablesb b SE z p>z LLCI ULCI
Constant 0.44 0.43 1.03 0.301 20.40 1.28
Participant sex (A) 0.47 0.64 0.74 0.462 20.79 1.74
Mating motivation (B) 20.04 0.59 20.06 0.951 21.19 1.12
Opponent attractiveness (C) 20.53 0.60 20.89 0.376 21.70 0.64
A 3 B 20.19 0.88 20.21 0.831 21.91 1.53
A 3 C 0.12 0.88 0.14 0.888 21.59 1.84
B 3 C 2.47 1.03 2.69 0.017 0.45 4.50
A 3 B 3 C 0.33 1.65 0.20 0.842 25.90 3.56
a N 5 189. Dependent variable was negotiation response selection, coded 1 for dodging and 0 for truthful message selection. LLCI 5 95%
confidence interval lower limit; ULCI5 95% confidence interval upper limit.
b Participant sex was coded 1 for men and 0 for women; mating motivation was coded 1 for the mating motivation activated condition and
0 for the mating motivation not activated condition; opponent attractiveness was coded 1 for attractive opponents and 0 for unattractive
opponents.
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betweenparticipant sex and opponent attractiveness
was not significant, b 5 0.04, p 5 .838.
Thus, as hypothesized, when the unethical be-
havior was a less severe violation of the norms of
socially acceptable behavior, women showed a sim-
ilar pattern to men such that they engaged in un-
ethical behavior when mating motivation was
activated and the opponent was attractive.
The Roles of Partnership Status and
Sexual Orientation
We conducted exploratory analysis to examine
whether having a partner and sexual orientation
moderated the effects for both outcome measures.
Adding this variable and all its interactions to the
models reported above revealed that the partnership
status did not moderate the focal three-way in-
teraction described above (ps . .817). While we
thought it was possible that the effects would be at-
tenuated among thosewith a partner, priorwork also
suggests that partnership status often does not alter
people’s mating-related behaviors (Simpson &
Gangestad, 1991), and our findings are consistent
with this possibility, although future research is
needed to fully explore the role of relationship status
in mating motivation effects on unethical behavior.
We also did not find significant interactions with
sexual orientation (ps. .600). However, we note that
only 4% (15 participants) of the sample selected
avalueabove themidpoint (indicatingpredominately
homosexual orientation), so the absence of a moder-
ating effect might be due to a relatively low power to
observe the effect among participants with a homo-
sexual orientation.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Three studies support an evolutionary model of
sex differences in unethical negotiation behavior.
Using a two-wave design, Study 1 found that in
employed adultswho engage innegotiation aspart of
their work, mating motivation predicted unethical
negotiation behaviors in men but not in women. Put
differently, sex differences in unethical negotiation
behaviorswere found at high, but not at low, levels of
mating motivation. Study 2 was a laboratory exper-
iment and showed that activating matingmotivation
led men, but not women, to negotiate more unethi-
cally, but onlywhennegotiatingwith other attractive
(but not unattractive) men (but not women), who
represent more formidable rivals for mates. Put dif-
ferently, men negotiated more unethically, but only
when their mating motivation was activated, and
when they negotiated with attractive men. Study 3
was another laboratory experiment and showed that
activating mating motivation led both men and
women to negotiate more unethically using less se-
vere unethical negotiation tactics when facing
amore attractive same-sex opponent, suggesting that
women’s unethical negotiation behavior is also
affected by mating motivation and intrasexual
TABLE 8
Study 3: Dodging Negotiation Behaviors by Condition, Simple Effects of the Mating Motivation Manipulation (Above) and
Participant Gender (Below)a
% of Participants who Used Dodging Simple Effects Simple Two-Way Interactions
Participant
sex
Opponent
attractiveness
Mating motivation
not activated
Mating motivation
activated
Simple effect of mating
motivation
Mating motivation3
opponent attractiveness
Male Unattractive 71.4% 66.7% b 520.05, p 5 .730 b 5 0.38, p5 .030
Attractive 62.5% 95.7% b 5 0.33, p 5 .002
Female Unattractive 60.9% 60.0% b 520.01, p 5 .951 b 5 0.44, p5 .017
Attractive 47.8% 91.3% b 5 0.43, p < .001
% of Participants who
Used Dodging
Simple Effects
Simple Two-Way
Interactions
Mating
motivation
Opponent
attractiveness Women Men
Simple effect of
participant sex
Participant sex3
opponent attractiveness
Activated Unattractive 60.0% 66.7% b5 0.07, p 5 .627 b5 20.02, p5 .881
Attractive 91.3% 95.7% b5 0.04, p 5 .549
Not activated Unattractive 60.9% 71.4% b5 0.11, p 5 .456 b5 0.04, p 5 .838
Attractive 47.8% 62.5% b5 0.15, p 5 .307
a Variables were coded the same as described in Table 3.
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competition, but the typeof unethical tactics effected
differ. Taken together, these findings provide sup-
port for our theory that the greater level of unethical
behavior found among men, compared to women, is
a consequence of an evolved male intrasexual com-
petition strategy and that it is systematically pro-
nounced and attenuated in key situations relevant
for intrasexual competition and reproductive fitness
(opponent attractiveness, opponent sex, severity of
violation of norms of socially acceptable behaviors).
Theoretical Contribution
This research contributes to the literature on un-
ethicalwork behavior in general (Kish-Gephart et al.,
2010; Treviño et al., 2014) and to the unethical ne-
gotiation literature more specifically (e.g., Dreber &
Johannesson, 2008; Haselhuhn & Wong, 2011; Kray
& Haselhuhn, 2012; Ma, 2010; Robinson et al., 2000;
Volkema, 2004; Westbrook et al., 2011). Employee
sex is one of themostwidely documented individual
differences in this literature, butmost research in this
domain was atheoretical (Franke et al., 1997). The
few studies suggesting explanations for sex differ-
ences focused on some form of socialization differ-
ences as an explanation. We sought to extend these
accounts by integrating them with evolutionary
theory. In so doing, we extend prior models by
explaining not just how sex differences are propa-
gated, but also why these specific sex differences
(rather than a reverse pattern of differences, or no
differences at all) would occur in the first place. The
theoretical extension through the focus on evolu-
tionary theory also allowed us to increase the pre-
dictive power of models of sex differences in
unethical negotiation behavior by specifying a range
of theoretically and practically meaningful bound-
ary conditions underwhich the sex difference arises.
Our theory and findings that attractive male op-
ponents can elicit unethical negotiation behaviors in
mating-motivated males qualifies a large body of
organizational literature, which by and large as-
sumes that attractive people generally enjoy more
favorable treatment in organizations than un-
attractive people (Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972;
Hosoda, Romero, & Coats, 2003). Hosoda et al. (2003)
conducted a meta-analysis of attractiveness dis-
crimination research and concluded that, “physical
attractiveness is always an asset.” Similarly, the ne-
gotiations literature suggests that attractive people
elicit more positive responses in negotiation
(Rosenblat, 2008; Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999). Re-
search on selection decisions identified several
conditions under which physical attractiveness
may backfire (Heilman & Stopeck, 1985; Jawahar
& Mattsson, 2005; Lee, Pitesa, Pillutla, & Thau,
2015b), but to the best of our knowledge our
studies are the first to theorize and detect such an
effect in the context of negotiation.
In making these theoretical contributions to the
organizational literature, our research demonstrates
thepromise of evolutionary theory for organizational
scholars. Organizational research, including negoti-
ations research, has not yet made significant use of
the evolutionary perspective despite its exceptional
parsimony and explanatory power that led to signifi-
cant advancements in other areas of social science,
including a better understanding of such fundamental
phenomena as conformity, altruism, and creativity
(Griskevicius et al., 2006a, 2006b, 2007).
Finally, we contribute to the disciplinary (psy-
chological) literature on sex-specific mating strate-
gies (e.g., Baker & Maner, 2008; Griskevicius et al.,
2009). This research identified several sex-specific
evolved tendencies for intrasexual competition for
mates, including consumption patterns, risk taking,
and aggression. Our research complements this past
work by identifying unethical behavior as another
sex-specific behavioral intrasexual competition
tendency. In addition, we contribute to this body of
work by connecting it in a theoretically rigorous way
with phenomena and research on physical attrac-
tiveness and social norm violation severity. These
phenomena are evolutionarily crucial factors affect-
ing selection pressures and the concomitant evolved
mating tendencies and sex differences, so our work
helps build a more holistic and integrative theory on
these important phenomena.
Limitations and Future Research
We found support for our theory using different
methodologies; however, our theory has some im-
plications that we did not test in this paper. For ex-
ample, we considered variation in the participants’
own attractiveness as exogenous to our theoretical
model for it to be relatively parsimonious. We ran-
domly assigned participants to experimental condi-
tions, so differences in participant attractiveness in
our experiment could not have influenced the pat-
tern of our results. However, unattractive males’
mating opportunities are generally lower compared
to attractive males’ mating opportunities (Buss,
2008; Ford & Beach, 1951; Sugiyama, 2005). This
disadvantage in the mating arena and the associated
need to strive harder to attain valuedoutcomesmight
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make unattractivemales competemore aggressively,
and conceivably also more unethically. This pre-
diction could be tested in future research by sys-
tematically pairingmale negotiators pre-classified in
terms of their own attractiveness with relatively
more or less attractive opponents.
Our research could also be extended by in-
vestigating different negotiation settings. We chose
to study distributive negotiations because of their
competitive nature, but extending our research to
integrative and mixed issues negotiations may be
interesting. In purely integrative negotiations it is
possible that mating motivation increases co-
operation, as gains can only be made through alli-
ance andpartnership. Inmixed issue negotiations, in
which both distributive and integrative issues are
present, we speculate that mating motivation would
steer negotiator attention to the distributive issues.
Integrative solutions may be less likely in such set-
tings. Future studies could also extend our reasoning
to coalition formation and systematically vary the
attractiveness of potential coalition partners. Our
prediction here would be that men would more
likely choose attractive coalition partnerswhen their
mating motivation is activated, as they present more
formidable cooperators (Lee et al., 2015b).
Another way in which our current work can be
extended in future investigations is to examine our
theory in face-to-face contexts. Based on existing
work on competitive tendencies in negotiation being
even stronger in higher-media richness contexts
(e.g., face-to-face rather than via online chat) (Swaab,
Galinsky, Medvec, & Diermeier, 2012), we would
expect to find stronger effects of mating motivation
on unethical negotiation behavior in face-to-face
distributive negotiations. Varying this difference in
study context might also allow researchers to ex-
amine how women’s potential lower perceived
competence in negotiations might feed into the pro-
cess we document. Specifically, Kray et al. (2014)
find in a face-to face context that women are de-
ceived more than men, and the effect was mediated
by women being perceived as less competent and
higher in warmth. We used highly standardized
computer-generated faces of the male and female
opponents that have been found not to vary in terms
of perceived competence and warmth (Lee et al.,
2015b). In face-to-face contexts, there would be nat-
ural variation along these dimensions, likely further
complicating the negotiation dynamics we observe
and potentially introducing cross-sex differences.
Further research is thus needed to replicate our
findings in face-to-face contexts and examine more
complex interactions at play in this consequential
situation.
Another limitation of ourwork, and apossible area
for future research, is to investigate the hormonal
underpinnings of the effects we document. Recent
work suggests that hormone levels, specifically tes-
tosterone and cortisol, underlie sex differences as-
sociatedwithmatingmotivation tendencies. A study
in consumer behavior found a positive relationship
between male prenatal testosterone levels and their
courtship-related consumption, suggesting that
greater testosterone levels are directly related to
mating motivation (Nepomuceno, Saad, Stenstrom,
Mendenhall, & Iglesias, 2016). Furthermore, greater
levels of testosterone, coupled with cortisol levels,
predict unethical behavior (Lee, Gino, Jin, Rice, &
Josephs, 2015a). Thus, it is likely that another pos-
sible way to operationalize the mediating mecha-
nism of the effect we find is to look at testosterone
levels. We believe that such an examination would
not lead to predictions beyond the ones we propose
here, but a deeper andmore thorough examination of
the underlying process would certainly allow for
a richer understanding of the phenomenon.
Another interesting question generated by our re-
search is to examine other conditions under which
women negotiate equally or even more unethically
thanmen.Asnoted earlier, past negotiationworkhas
been criticized for focusing on a limited set of con-
texts andbehaviors, underwhichmenmight bemore
likely to be unethical (Kennedy & Kray, 2015). We
believe evolutionary theory could be used to further
improve the generalizability of the conclusions in
the negotiation literature. Evolutionary psychology
suggests that sex ratio might be one such factor.
When the sex ratio is biased toward females such that
the majority of people in the environment are fe-
males, women’s mating chances are lower than
males, and intrasexual competition among women
increases (Hill & Hurtado, 1996). Past research has
examined sex differences in social behavior in
female-biased relative to male-biased environments
and environments with equal sex ratios. This re-
search found reversal of sex differences in con-
sumption, career choices, and aspiration levels
(Durante, Griskevicius, Simpson, Cantu´, & Tybur,
2012; Griskevicius, Tybur, Ackerman, Delton,
Robertson, & White, 2012). In such situations, it is
possible that rates of unethical behavior in negotia-
tion as an intrasexual competition strategy increases.
We believe that the investigation of sex ratios in or-
ganizational settings through the lens of evolution-
ary theory is an exciting avenue for future research.
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Managerial Implications
We cited some notable costs of unethical negotia-
tion behavior at the outset of the paper, including
mistrust between negotiating parties and reputa-
tional damage. Our findings suggest conditions un-
der which these consequences are more likely for
male negotiators.We find thatmen aremore likely to
negotiate unethically when they are motivated to
mate and when they negotiate with other men, and
particularly attractive men. One implication of our
findings is that when assigning males to negotiate,
managers should be mindful of the likelihood that
intrasexual competitionmotivation in thesemales is
high. Past research has uncovered some easy-to-
observe characteristics that imply higher levels of
intrasexual competition tendencies in males. For
example, younger males might be more likely to ex-
hibit behaviors associated with intrasexual compe-
tition (Wilson & Daly, 1985). Perhaps the most
straightforward managerial implication of our find-
ings is that when concerns about unethical negotia-
tion behavior are large (e.g., when the temptation to
behave unethically is high), managers might want to
assign females to negotiate rather than males.
To the extent that unethical behavior (including
that brought about bymating motivation, as we find)
is mediated by testosterone and cortisol levels as
suggested by Lee et al. (2015a), perhaps reducing the
stressfulness of negotiations (i.e., lowering cortisol
levels) may help tomitigate the increase in unethical
negotiation behavior for individualswhohave greater
mating motivation (i.e., those with greater testoster-
one levels). Alternatively, organizations may sched-
ule negotiations in the afternoon rather than in the
morning, since testosterone levels tend to be highest
in the morning and decrease throughout the day
(Resko & Eik-nes, 1966). Our theory also implies that
negotiator team compositionmay influence unethical
negotiation behaviors. Teams with very few women
but many men may entice more unethical behavior
than more equally-balanced negotiation teams. Orga-
nizational culture is also important to curbsomeof the
effects we document here. Machismo or risk-taking
cultures, such as those found in investment banking,
fuelmale competitiveness and are likely to exacerbate
the effects we document.
CONCLUSION
This paper is among the few to test an evolutionary
model of sex differences in organizational behaviors.
We believe that this theory is highly generative in
making novel predictions about long-standing
questions in organizational research, andwe find that
sex differences in unethical negotiation behavior,
a phenomenon that has long been inadequately the-
orized, can be explained by this perspective.Wehope
that future organizational research makes further use
of this parsimoniousmodel to answer questions about
important phenomena in organizations.
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